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The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think 
tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international  
policy debate in Australia – economic, political and strategic – and it is 
not limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an 
accessible and high quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues 
and conferences. 
 
Lowy Institute Policy Briefs are designed to address a particular, current 
policy issue and to suggest solutions. They are deliberately prescriptive, 
specifically addressing two questions: What is the problem? What should 
be done? 
The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and  
not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. 
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WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
The Australian Government has drawn a line under its previous efforts to 
isolate Fiji after the 2006 coup. That approach lost Australia influence in 
Fiji and the wider region and did little to restore Fiji’s democracy. 
Australia will point to Fiji’s much-anticipated election on 17 September as 
a sign that the country is back on the road to democracy. The problem is 
that this election will not be enough to restore democracy to Fiji. 
 
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
Australia should continue to back Fiji’s transition to democracy beyond 
the elections, even as it seeks to regain its lost influence. Australia 
should use what leverage it has to help to assist Fiji’s Parliament, 
develop better communications between civil society, the media and the 
government, and support the development of an independent judiciary. 
Persuading a newly elected Fiji Government of the merits of revitalising 
these essential elements of democracy will be a challenge. Australia 
should offer an enhanced military relationship as well as new 
partnerships with the Fiji Parliament and the knowledge sector and 
support for the rule of law as a means of encouraging the Fiji 
Government’s commitment to democracy.  
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Eight years after a military coup removed an elected government, Fiji will 
hold its first general election on 17 September 2014. The election will 
see a number of old parties and a prominent new one – FijiFirst, led by 
the Prime Minister and leader of the 2006 coup, Rear-Admiral (ret) 
Voreqe Bainimarama – contest 50 seats in a single chamber parliament. 
Almost 600,000 registered voters will vote for a single candidate in a 
single national constituency, for the first time, under a new open-list 
proportional representation electoral system. 
The election is a watershed moment for Fiji’s transition to democracy 
after eight years of authoritarian rule. Australia has lobbied long and hard 
for elections in Fiji. But what comes after the elections will be a greater 
test for Australia’s influence in the Pacific Islands region. 
Since the December 2006 coup that brought then-commodore 
Bainimarama to power, successive Australian governments have sought 
to isolate and pressure Fiji. Australia cut off defence ties, redirected its 
aid program and imposed travel sanctions on the perpetrators of the 
coup and on those who took positions in the new government. In 
January 2009, Australia and New Zealand were at the forefront of efforts 
in the Pacific Islands Forum to compel Bainimarama to announce 
elections by 1 May or face suspension from the Forum. Fiji was duly 
suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum on 2 May 2009. 
These efforts were unsuccessful. The sanctions caused significant 
inconvenience to members of the Fiji Government and military, but the 
impact was not sufficiently damaging to induce any change in their 
thinking. The Fiji Government also used the sanctions to spin a narrative 
of a big power unfairly punishing a small country and harming the Fiji 
economy. 
Despite the importance of Australia to the Fiji economy, the Fiji 
Government realigned its foreign policy outlook to ensure it was less 
dependent on Australia and New Zealand. Fiji built new diplomatic 
relations with approximately 70 countries and enhanced its ties with first 
China, and later Russia. It stepped up its leadership efforts within the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group and established the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum to exert regional influence at the expense of 
Australia, which was excluded from both organisations.  
In February 2014, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, who had 
signalled concern about Australia’s waning influence, met Prime Minister 
Bainimarama during a visit to Fiji.
1
 Bishop announced the normalisation 
of Australian relations with Fiji and effectively drew a line under the tough 
approach taken by the Howard, Rudd and Gillard governments. A new 
package of support included more assistance for election preparations, 
the introduction of a public service 'twinning' arrangement, and the 
proposed inclusion of Fijians in any expansion of Australia’s seasonal 
workers' program. Bishop also announced a review of the travel 
sanctions, which were then removed in March 2014 by an Australian 
The election is a 
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Fiji’s transition to 
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years of authoritarian 
rule. 
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cabinet decision. Bishop indicated that key aspects of the suspended 
defence cooperation program would be restored after the elections. 
Bishop’s policy helped restore a measure of Australian influence in Fiji. 
Canberra subtly leveraged the sweeteners in its assistance package to 
secure Fiji’s agreement for enhanced Australian assistance for the 
elections (valued at $2.65 million) and a role in the Multinational 
Observer Group monitoring the election.
2
 Australia needs to build on this 
change in approach to both re-establish its influence in Fiji and to help 
the country to gradually restore democracy. 
WHY IS FIJI IMPORTANT? 
Australia’s interests in Fiji are linked to Australia’s regional strategic 
interests. After its own defence, Australia’s most important strategic 
interest, as identified by the 2013 Defence White Paper, is “the security, 
stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, which we share 
with Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and South Pacific states.”
3
 In June 
2014 Bishop described the Pacific as “central to Australia’s foreign 
policy.”
4
 
Fiji has the second largest population and second largest economy 
among the independent Pacific Island states. It has traditionally been 
very active in regional forums and sees itself as a regional leader and a 
voice for island states on the international stage. Without Fiji’s 
cooperation it is difficult for Australia to implement regional initiatives on 
issues ranging from security to trade and development. In this regard, 
the recent improvement in Australia’s relationship with Fiji since Bishop’s 
change in approach is a boost to Australia’s influence in the region. 
Fiji is, however, also important in the context of Australia’s support for 
democratic values in the Pacific Islands. In a speech in November 2013, 
Bishop said: “Support for democracy is, and will continue to be, a key 
thread in the overall fabric of Australia’s engagement with the region, 
reflecting our desire to make a contribution as a good global citizen.” She 
added that Australia is working with partner governments to “promote 
good governance and effective institutions as the essential building 
blocks of free societies.”
5
  
If, as seems likely, the elections produce a Bainimarama-led 
government, his authoritarian approach to government makes a full 
transition to democracy improbable. Bainimarama and Attorney-General 
Aiyaz Sayed Khaiyum currently share 20 portfolios and are accustomed 
to making decisions without reference to a cabinet or a parliament. The 
2013 Constitution will enable Bainimarama to continue to centralise 
many powers in his own office and that of the Attorney-General. ANU 
historian Brij Lal argues that the new Fiji constitution “contains provisions 
that make a mockery of the Westminster system of government” and 
If, as seems likely, the 
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reduces the Parliament to playing a “pliant role in the governance of the 
country.”
6
 
It may be tempting for Fiji’s partners, including Australia, to recognise the 
elections as the restoration of democracy in order to quickly return 
relations with Fiji to a more positive footing. But if Australia were to signal 
its willingness to accept such a low bar for the restoration of democracy, 
it would set a dangerous precedent for the maintenance of democratic 
norms in the region. Australia will need to find a way to do both: to 
rebuild its relations with Fiji in the interests of its regional influence while 
also pushing Fiji towards a full restoration of democracy. 
MORE THAN JUST ELECTIONS 
There is a widespread expectation that the 17 September poll will be 
judged free on the day.
7
 Both the Australian and New Zealand foreign 
ministers have made comments to the media indicating their confidence 
in the success of the elections.
8
 The rigour that the Fiji Elections Office 
has established for both the voting process and vote count suggest that 
it will be difficult for any party to rig the results. If the Elections Office 
does its job to the letter, every registered voter should be able to 
exercise a secret ballot.
9
  
Other elements of the election process have been far from fair. Section 
23 of the Electoral Decree on the eligibility of candidates requires 
candidates to have lived in Fiji for at least 18 months out of the two years 
prior to being nominated.
 10
 This disadvantages people who were 
engaged in politics in Fiji before the 2006 coup and have since left Fiji 
and professionals who work outside Fiji. Section 115 of the Electoral 
Decree prohibits individuals and organisations which receive funding 
assistance from outside Fiji from conducting public debate or publishing 
material related to election issues, thus restricting freedom of speech 
and assembly that should be an integral feature of a democratic election 
campaign.
11
 
While serving governments in many countries enjoy an electoral 
advantage from incumbency, Bainimarama’s dominance of the Fiji polity 
gives him an edge. The lack of any formal opposition in Fiji for eight 
years means that Bainimarama is the most recognised candidate in the 
country. His image is everywhere, from road safety billboards to stickers 
plastered across the rear windows of taxis. The voting system devised 
by his government requires voters to pick only one candidate from 
among hundreds so Bainimarama’s unparalleled prominence works in 
FijiFirst’s favour.  
FijiFirst is likely to win a majority or win the highest number of votes but 
fail to see them converted into the 26 seats required to govern in its own 
right. Bainimarama has stated that he is not interested in governing in a 
coalition. But he may well revise this view if negotiations for a coalition 
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with a smaller party enable him to assume the prime ministership instead 
of returning to the polls. The Constitution requires the dissolution of 
Parliament and the issuing of writs for a new election where no party has 
won 50 per cent of the vote and no prime ministerial candidate wins the 
support of more than 50 per cent of members of parliament.  
Even if the election is relatively free and fair, it will not put Fiji back on a 
solid path to democracy. The 2006 coup has had a deep impact on Fiji 
governance and society.
12
 Since the coup, and even more since the 
abrogation of the constitution in 2009, the fundamentals and the 
institutions of democracy have suffered in Fiji.  
A once-free media in Fiji is no longer so. Official censorship of the media 
lifted in 2012. But even without official censorship, the 2010 Media 
Industry Development Decree imposes tough penalties on journalists for 
criticising the government, leading editors to practise various forms of 
self-censorship.
13
 Some journalists have alleged government 
intimidation.
14
 
Fiji’s once-capable and independent judiciary has been plagued by 
internal divisions since the George Speight coup in 2000. It was further 
compromised in 2009, when President Iloilo abrogated the constitution 
and revoked all judicial appointments.
15
 Legal officials considered 
friendly to Bainimarama’s regime were reappointed and the large gap in 
judicial capacity was filled with new recruits from Sri Lanka on short-term 
contracts and thus beholden to the Fiji Government. 
The intimidation of civil society has also served to diminish the capacity 
of non-government organisations to play their proper accountability role 
in Fiji. The Citizens Constitutional Forum (CCF), an NGO that engages 
in community education on constitutional matters, democracy, human 
rights and multiculturalism, is an example. The CCF was accused in 
early August of breaching Section 115 of the Electoral Decree 2014 with 
the publication of a research paper on international benchmarks for free 
and fair elections and for holding a public conversation on this issue.
16
 
Other prominent members of civil society organisations have reported 
being detained and abused.
17
 The ability of NGOs to convene meetings 
is constrained by government decree. 
By remaining Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) 
until March 2014, Bainimarama has strengthened the influence of the 
military on Fiji’s government and society. By appointing military officers 
as the heads of government agencies and by improving their benefits 
and status, including as protectors of the constitution and the Fiji people, 
he has made it difficult for Fiji’s military to return to a role that is 
appropriate for militaries in a democracy.  
The intimidation of civil 
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WHAT SHOULD AUSTRALIA DO? 
If the results of the 17 September poll and the subsequent allocation of 
seats in parliament are judged credible by the Multinational Observer 
Group, Australia should welcome the election outcome. An early visit to 
Fiji by Julie Bishop after the formation of a new government will be a 
critical step in rebuilding the relationship. But given Bainimarama’s 
authoritarian proclivities, Australia needs to be cautious about signalling 
too quickly its acceptance of his democratic legitimacy, if indeed he is 
elected prime minister. Elections should be seen as the start of a 
process of restoring Fiji’s democracy, not the end.  
In a speech to the Australia-Fiji Business Council in June 2013, Bishop 
listed some elements of the Australian democratic experience that she 
regarded as vital. She said: “It is essential that oppositions and 
politicians have the freedom to hold the government to account. It is 
essential that an independent judiciary exists to adjudicate disputes and 
to interpret the law. A free and unfettered media might be a complete 
pain in the neck for politicians but it is essential to hold all the sides of 
politics to account on behalf of the people.”
18
  
Working from this basis, Australia should pursue three key additional 
initiatives in its effort to re-establish democracy in Fiji:
19
 
First, establish a program of parliament-to-parliament assistance: 
the vital Fiji parliamentary offices of the Secretary-General (Clerk) and 
Speaker as well as newly elected parliamentarians will need training and 
development opportunities and expert support to enable them to perform 
their new roles. Fiji should be invited as soon as possible to join the 
Pacific Parliamentary Partnerships program, an initiative of Australia’s 
federal, state and territory parliaments in partnership with the United 
Nations Development Program. While funded principally by the 
Australian aid program, the program is linked to twinning arrangements 
between the parliaments of Australia and Pacific members of the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Its focus is on the 
professional development of parliamentarians, capacity building of 
parliamentary secretariats and community outreach for 
parliamentarians.
20
 The advantage of this program is that it is managed 
by parliaments, not governments, and is therefore more likely to be 
considered apolitical.  
Second, develop a ‘knowledge sector initiative’ to support the 
strengthening of civil society and media: NGOs, other civil society 
leaders and the media in Fiji need support to play a constructive role in 
rebuilding democracy and holding the government to account. The Fiji 
Government has been suspicious of NGOs that receive international 
support and an elected government may well harbour similar doubts 
about international players being involved in this sector. However, 
Australia and Indonesia’s Knowledge Sector Initiative provides a model 
that might also work for Fiji. 
21
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The Australian-Indonesian Partnership for Pro-Poor Policy: Knowledge 
Sector Initiative was created to help civil society and research institutions 
develop innovative approaches to development in Indonesia. The 15-
year program is designed to strengthen Indonesia’s public policies 
through better use of local knowledge. It is based on the notion that 
“arming citizens with evidence and information is the best way to 
develop legitimacy” and so “supports a broad range of actors from within 
Indonesian civil society to increase the contestability of public policy.”
22
  
A similar model in Fiji could bring together government policymakers, 
civil society, including NGOs and universities, and media to share 
information on national development and economic issues. Such an 
initiative could help the Fiji Government make better use of the civil 
sector’s knowledge and research. It would also better equip NGOs and 
the media to analyse and report on government policies. 
Third, support the recruitment of reputable judges from 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, including in Africa and the 
Caribbean, to help restore the independence and the capacity of 
the Fiji judiciary: Fiji’s judiciary needs to be competent and 
independent for the sake of the country’s return to democracy. But this is 
also important in terms of promoting economic development and 
attracting foreign investment. Foreign investors need to have confidence 
that disputes will be adjudicated in a manner consistent with the rule of 
law and that contracts will be upheld. Indeed, this economic dimension 
to judicial reform would be a powerful incentive for the government. 
Although the capacity and independence of the judiciary had already 
been damaged by successive coups, the 2009 sacking of judges 
delivered it a near-fatal blow. The 2013 Constitution gives the 
government significant control over the judiciary, which will continue to 
constrain its independence after the elections. Australia can assist in 
rebuilding the judiciary by supporting, partly via the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, the recruitment of judges from other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions which share broadly similar legal systems with Fiji.  
LEVERAGE THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 
All of these initiatives will require skilled Australian diplomacy and 
patience. But they also require real leverage if Bainimarama is elected 
prime minister. Australia certainly has that in its defence relationship with 
Fiji. Of all the measures Canberra adopted to signal its displeasure at 
Bainimarama’s 2006 coup, the termination of defence ties cut the 
deepest.
23
 The loss of long-established training and support 
relationships with Australia had a negative impact on the capability of the 
RFMF, which has been problematic for its international peacekeeping 
role.  
Bishop has already announced that Australia would re-establish a 
defence relationship with Fiji following the elections. Australia has invited 
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Fiji to send a defence representative to Canberra, and it wants to 
reinstate an Australian defence attaché in Suva. Fiji will be invited to 
participate again in Australia’s Pacific Patrol Boat Program. A defence 
cooperation program that includes joint exercises and staff-college 
training will be re-established. 
A reconstituted Defence Cooperation Program and some additional 
measures of assistance will help in reforming and forging new 
professional links for the RFMF while binding it closer to Australia. 
Inviting the RFMF to take part in training exercises in northern Australia, 
alongside the ADF and other defence partners, would play to Fiji’s desire 
to see its military linked to elite counterparts. Enhanced military-to-
military activities, including high-level dialogues and even Australia-Fiji 
military rugby matches would appeal to the Fiji military. Appointing a Fiji 
military fellow at the Australian Civil-Military Centre would also be a 
constructive gesture in strengthening the military-to-military relationship. 
Immediately following the election, Bishop should outline further 
elements of the assistance package she introduced in February to 
include an enhanced military relationship as well as new partnerships 
with Parliament and the knowledge sector and support for the rule of 
law. As with Bishop’s previous approach to Fiji she should indicate that 
there are no strings attached to the new elements. A blunt quid pro quo 
approach is unlikely to help build trust with a newly elected Fiji 
government. If it is necessary to leverage the military elements to secure 
progress with the civilian elements of the proposed assistance, this can 
be more subtly managed in the timing of implementation.  
CONCLUSION  
Fiji’s election on 17 September will test both the Fiji Government’s 
commitment to democracy and Australian policy in the region. Canberra 
must avoid compromising its efforts to promote democratic change in Fiji 
for the sake of increasing its regional influence. It is possible to do both 
at the same time even if it is likely to prove extremely challenging.  
Australia’s interests are more likely to be realised in Fiji if the rule of law 
is respected, an unfettered media and civil society flourishes and if the 
military stays out of politics. Fiji will only be able to consolidate the 
progress established by the election if other democratic institutions and 
building blocks are supported. If Australia does not take the lead in 
providing this assistance, then who will? 
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